My responses to Prof. Bolaji Aluko on Lt. Col. Victor Banjo

(Following some exchanges concerning the betrayal of the late Lt. Col. Victor Adebukunola Banjo by elements of the Yoruba leadership shortly before the Nigerian civil war in 1967, a few of my responses are hereby collated, drawing extensively from the book, A break in the Silence: Lt. Col. Adebukunola Banjo, by Prof. Adetowun Ogunsheye. These were mainly posted to, naijapolitics, omoodua, talknigeria and yorubaworld - all being discussion groups hosted by Yahoo).

Response to Prof. Bolaji Aluko on Victor Banjo (1)

Prof. Aluko, You wrote:

>Wale: While waiting for the 24-hours to read more excerpts, I am intrigued at
>the gospel-like nature that you have conferred on Auntie Bimpe's book on
>her brother, which can only be second-hand accounts.

I disagree with your assertion about “second hand account”. First, the woman, along with her husband (Prof. Ayo Ogunsheye), was a member of the Yoruba Leaders of Thought group assembled to chart a way forward for the Yoruba Nation in the aftermath of the July 1966 counter-coup by Northern military officers.

Secondly, it is not my view that you should agree with what I write. But kindly understand that God also endowed we younger ones with some wisdom to understand certain unspoken words. Persons junior to me work with the CIA and MI6 as analysts pouring over scores of documents to positively identify threats and proffer solutions to challenges without being on the field AT ALL! Ojukwu’s book is welcome anytime he wants to publish it. But whatever he writes will be placed side by side with other accounts of the war for each individual or group to make up their minds about the ‘truth’. And that is what I have done given the books and other accounts of the war I have digested so far.

But please read Prof. Ogunsheye’s account as my response to this first issue. Other answers will follow shortly:

“In July of 1966, the Northern army officers executed their own coup. They killed Maj. Gen. Ironsi, the Head of State, while he was a guest of the Western Region Military Governor, Col. Adekunle Fajuyi. It was alleged that Fajuyi had opted to die with Ironsi with whom he refused to surrender. sOther rumours alleged that he was given no such option but was taken away with Ironsi. They were both killed. The Western Region had also become a victim in the Northern coup.

“The army officers retaliated the killing of the civilian Prime Minister and the Northern Premier and quite a number of army officers of Northern origin by killing many Ibo army officers. This was followed in the North by the pogrom, a genocide massacre directed at Ibos in the North. Many Yorubas were also victims of this massacre. It took everybody by surprise. There was a mass exodus of Ibos to the East and a similar movement of Yorubas to the West.

“Gowon was installed as the new Head of State in Lagos. He was not of Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, but he was a Northerner. He appointed another Army officer, Adeyinka Adebayo as governor for the West. He also released the Western Region Leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who had been put in detention by the Tafawa Balewa government, thus mollifying the West. Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the East had declared secession and the creation of Biafra in response to the genocide against the Ibos in the Northern riots.

“With the arrival of the Yoruba refugees in the West, the Yoruba leadership was in a dilemma. Under Gowon’s regime, the family had enjoyed a respite from harassment and had experienced a feeling of being back into the mainstream of politics. My husband and I were, therefore, invited to the Yoruba Leaders of Thought meeting. This meeting was called to deliberate on the stand of the Yorubas. They decided at the meeting that if the East was allowed to secede, the West would not be part of a truncated Nigeria. They would also secede.

“In the confusion that followed the pogrom, Gowon, in a statement, had admitted that the basis for one Nigeria no longer seemed to exist. Ojukwu in the Eastern Region had meanwhile declared secession and requested Ibos to come back to the East. There was a mass migration of Ibos to the East, not only from the North, but also from the West. Ojukwu had also released all Ffederal Government detainees in the Eastern Region.

We gathered that Victor was among those he released. He was now a free man. He had offered to come over to the West and offered his services to the Gowon Government. Gowon is alleged to have replied that he could only come over as a prisoner. Instead of leaving the country, as we expected him to do, he had stayed on as friend and adviser to Ojukwu. It was alleged that he was helping him to train an Army for reasons he gave in the next episode as Commander of the National Liberation Army. The family with this development came again under the surveillance of the federal forces in power.”

Wale Adedayo

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(Banjo was detained from January 18, 1966 - May 30/first week in June
1967. [When he was released is questionable, but my gut feeling was that
it was within days of May 30. Banjo stated that he was detained for 14
months in his August 1967 Midwest broadcast. That would put his release
at February/March 1967, unless of course he was talking about being
jailed in one place (Ikot-Ekpene? ) for 14 months. Obi Nwakanma says
that he was released by Ojukwu in April - but how could that be since
Ojukwu had no power to release a man jailed for TREASON to the NATION in
APril 1967 BEFORE he declared Biafra on May 30, 1967? Besides, Banjo's
release in April would put him in the East - and possibly in Enugu - in
May 5-7 when Awolowo's delegation met with Ojukwu. Was Banjo anywhere
around then? Is there any record of that? Or since Awolowo was jailed
in nearby Calabar until August 1966 - meaning that Banjo and Awo were
co-prisoners within travelling distance of each other for possibly 5 - 7
months, maybe they discussed and agreed on the Midwest incursion then?
) –Prof. Bolaji Aluko.

Prof. Ogunsheye: “After the (Yoruba) Leaders of Thought meeting, a decision had been taken to contact him (Victor Banjo). We (herself & husband) were required to provide a code which will assure him that they (those sent on the mission) were not spies, but bona fide emissary of the West. We had suggested that they used a combination of numbers that was derived from the registration numbers of our two cars. It seemed brilliant at the time. We felt the West was going to get help. We had seemed exposed and helpless after the Leaders of Thought meeting.

“It was rumoured that soldiers of Western origin had been disarmed, and armed soldiers of Northern origin had not been resposted to the North as was agreed. Instead, they had been reinforced by soldiers of Chadian origin.

“The West was, therefore, in a state of siege by the Northern soldiers. It was rumoured that some Ibos who had stayed in the West had been molested in the market and were stoutly defended by the Yorubas. Some Ibos were in fact taking refuge with some Yoruba families. The university staff who were of Ibo origin had almost all left the University of Ibadan campus. It was rumoured that the North was ready to subdue the West militarily.

“Then came the news that a force led by Col. Banjo had invaded the Mid-West. This made the family jittery. I concluded he was coming in response to the request from the West. But how did he mobilize troops so quickly? Who were members of his army? This was explained at dusk of the same day by his broadcast as Brigadier Victor Banjo, Commander of the National Liberation Army.” A break in the silence: Lt. Col. Victor Adebukunola Banjo (pgs 46 – 47).

Prof. Bolaji Aluko: (- Re-structuring of Nigeria from 4 regions to 12 states occurred on May
27; secession by Biafra occurred May 30, war started July 6 as "police
action" from the Federal side, and invasion of the Midwest started
August 9, and movement to the West was to proceed without delay
thereafter. Was the invasion/liberation of the Midwest/West planned
BEFORE the secession/war, or does it take a month for plan it, and for
Banjo to also commence and conclude all the agreements with the top
political and military leaders of the Midwest and West? Where, for
example, according to Obi Nwakanma, was the vote taken in which
OGBEMUDIA voted for the take-over, and only one un-named person voted
against it?)

I believe Ojukwu was hasty in the decision to implement the secessionist plan almost immediately. Strategically, he could have bought more time for the young nation by noise making and other kinds of propaganda as he continues negotiation/mediation with Gowon while training and arming the Biafran Army, away from Federal glare. Afterall, the East, as it were then was a no go area for ANY federal sysmpathiser. Banjo mentioned something similar in his defence at the kangaroo tribunal that sentenced the cream de la cream of the Biafra war efforts to an unkind death by firing squad. Invasion of the Mid-West to me could have been part of a strategy to move into the West as part of the agreement reached at the Yoruba Leaders of Thought meeting, where it was agreed that the West should ask Banjo for help.

The first person Banjo called on the phone after making his broadcast in Benin was his elder sister to get a final go ahead for the man to move into the West with his troops. As per the dates, I am not good at that. But you may want to take a cue from what Prof. Ogunsheye wrote on pages 55 – 57:

“This broadcast (by Banjo) was neither relayed by any other radio station in Nigeria nor did any newspaper dare pick it up. The transcript copy of the broadcast here presented was obtained from the British Broadcasting Corporation Transcription Service. All through the war, people continue to link Victor falsely with the January 1966 coup. Similarly, there was a great confusion about his role as the head of a force consisting largely of Biafran soldiers. It was clear to me that he had borrowed the soldiers to attempt a liberation of the West. He had heard about the decisions of the Western Leaders of Thought meeting to secede, if Biafra was allowed to go and disarming of Yoruba soldiers in the West, the infiltration of foreign Chadian soldiers to reinforce the soldiers of Northern origin, whose removal from the West had not been implemented and the general siege situation in the West of an army of occupation.

“It was alleged that Awolowo did meet him, when he visited the East on a peace mission before the announcement of secession. Victor in his marathon defence before the Biafran Tribunal confirmed that there was a previous agreement with the Western leaders. ‘When Ojukwu decided to declare an independent Republic of Biafra, I pleaded with him to postpone it as both the people of West and Mid-West were not as yet at that stage sufficiently strong militarily to take the same stand, even though they would wish it. I pointed out to him that his declaration of Biafra was not consistent with our plans and agreements. I told him that the people of the West, who were acting on the basis of the fact that I would bring assistance to them from here would consider the decision to declare Biafra at that time a betrayal of our agreement (Nelson Ottah)’

“There was no doubt that Victor borrowed troops from Ojukwu and received his help in the form of a Liberation Army. He had assisted Ojukwu with training of Biafran troops and fought brilliantly to protect the Northern Front as head of the 101^st Division. In return, Ojukwu let him have the free hand to use the Brigade Victor led to liberate the Mid-West. His intention was to proceed to the West to liberate it. There were no previous written conditions attached on the political dispensation of the Mid-West except that it would be free and independent of both Biafra and the Federal Government.

“In fact, it was a Liberation Army as he emphasized in his broadcast. Njoku, in his book: A tradegy without heroes, confirmed that before the Mid-West invasion of August 9, 1967, there was no information with the Biafran Army Commander Headquarters about Biafran troops on operation to the Mid-West. The letter dated 22^nd August received at the Army Headquarters in Enugu in which Ojukwu was alleged to have given specific instructions about the Mid-West invasion was an afterthought. It was written and sent after Victor had successfully invaded and took over the Mid-West and delivered his famous Radio Broadcast on August 14, 1967. According to Njoku’s account, ‘Victor’s speech angered everybody, including Ojukwu himself.’ Victor was immediately recalled to Enugu and placed under house arrest. Other accounts said Victor was so popular with his troops that Ojukwu had to pretend to be inviting him to Enugu for consultation. In fact, writes Njoku, ‘As the situation deteriorated (in the Benin war sector, in Victor’s absence), Ojukwu mysteriously freed Brigadier Banjo from arrest and returned him to active command of the 54^th Brigade on the 6^th September 1967.’ This was when Ojukwu took over the operations and it became a Biafran operation and conquest of the Mid-West.

“The speed of the 9^th of August operation had taken everyone by surprise. Victor had studied military strategy and had employed an element of surprise in his two pronged invasion of the Mid-West taking on both Benin and the important oil town of Warri. He had been involved in training the Biafran Army. He had applied his knowledge of military engineering acquired at Shrivenham, The Royal Military College of Science, now Cranfield University, to the local fabrication and manufacture of weapons, tanks and other military weaponry that now grace the War Museum Collection as examples of indigenous effort. It was understandable that in return for for his services as he said in his speech, Ojukwu should agree to let him have troops for the liberation of the West.

“I was worried after his broadcast. Will the West accept his offer of liberation by a troop made up of Biafran soldiers? Suddenly, the telephone rang. Victor’s voice came on loud and clear from nowhere! ‘Hi Sis! It’s me!’ I could not believe it. We have not heard from him since the Eastern Region declared secession on May 30, 1967. ‘Where are you speaking from?’ I said, with fear for his safety gripping me. ‘I am speaking from Benin.’ ‘Are you sure it is safe to speak? I listened to your broadcast as Brigadier of the Liberation Army.’ ‘You don’t have to worry about telephone tapping of this conversation. I have fixed a device at this end to scramble it, in case anyone was listening in. How are things at Ibadan?’ ‘Tense, but quiet,’ I replied. ‘We hope to be in Ibadan by tomorrow. But I don’t want to fight my way through. I don’t want my homeland, Yorubaland, to become the theatre of war. Do you think they still want me to come?’ ‘Buk, beware, that the Ilorin Afonja episode does not repeat itself. On that historic occasion, the invited force assassinated their host and installed themselves in power. Ilorin has since been ruled by them.’ ‘No, Sis. That is why I want to know if my forces will be welcomed. If at least 50% of the people are in favour, I shall come in. We are a Liberation Army, not an invading force.’ ‘Ayo is away in Lagos. You should phone one of the front benchers in the Leaders of Thought Committee,’ I said. ‘Do you have a telephone number of any of them?’ he asked. ‘No. I don’t. But I can look up the Ibadan directory for you.’ Suddenly, there was a buzz on the line and it went dead.

“Fifteen minutes later, a member of the front benchers called. He had called earlier in the day to apprise me of the presence of Victor in Benin. ‘Buk just phoned,’ I said. ‘He wants to know if 50% of the people still want him to come.’ ‘Why is he asking for their approval? Most of these leaders are fence-sitters,’ he said. ‘He should have just marched in.’ ‘This was not my impression of the leaders at the Yoruba Leaders of Thought meeting,’ I replied. The Leaders of Thought meeting had taken place some months back. Since then, a lot had happened on the Western Front. Chief Awolowo had joined Gowon’s Government. ‘Do not take any more phone calls. It is dangerous now,’ he said, before he left.

Wale Adedayo

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Prof. Bolaji Aluko: (Does Auntie Bimpe's book tell you/us anything about where Victor Banjo was between August 22 and September 22? Was he in Biafra,
commanding troops towards Lagos, or just in Benin, either giving orders
or arguing endlessly with Ojukwu?)

I believe this has been answered in the second part where the woman revealed Banjo was detained by Ojukwu for his effrontery in making the categorical statements he did after the successful seizure of the Mid-West.

(If, in fact the Western leaders BETRAYED him, that means that he could
NOT convince Ojukwu of that, whereupon he was executed on September 25,
1967. Would that not be a miscarriage of justice, some kind of
scape-goatism? But more intriguing, who betrayed Ifeajuna, Agbamuche
and Alale - the same Midwestern/Western leaders?)

No sir! The four guys murdered by Ojukwu through the machinations of those envious of their brilliance and closeness to Ojukwu had almost the same thoughts. Banjo was betrayed on three fronts – Yoruba Leaders who accepted the Hausa-Fulani divide and conquer gift of including them in Gowon’s government; the ‘Federal’ Government and the Biafran Nation, which exhibited the worst form of ingratitude to a military genius whose warning they refused to heed leading to the avoidable slaughter and needless deaths of thousands either through bullets, bombs or hunger. The other three were betrayed by the same ‘Federal’ Government, because as in the case of Banjo, they wanted rapprochement with Nigeria and by the Igbo people, who refused to see the danger clearly ahead of them despite warnings by the brilliant trio who did more than all the Njokus of this world in the way and manner they pursued the Biafran agenda.

(For me, when I read Banjo's speech, Ojukwu's letter and the chronology
of events, there are just too many things that don't add up, and really,
it is hard for me to see how Prof. Bimpe Ogunseye's sisterly book can
shed light on these.)

The following is Prof. Ogunsheye’s analytical response to Ojukwu’s letter of after thought:

“This letter had been overtaken by events. The West had been rearmed and were now participating in the Federal Government as partners. Awolowo was now a Federal Minister in Gowon’s government. Victor, however, did not raise any issue with Ojukwu. He knew the situation had changed. He could now only march to the West as an invader at the head of a Brigade of foreign Biafran troops. He had announced on August 9 in Benin that he was fighting for one Nigeria. Ojukwu in his letter rejected the idea of one Nigeria and in fact sought its dismemberment. The East, he reaffirmed, would not be part of one Nigeria. There was no going back on its secession and separation from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was, however, ready to annex the Mid-West now regarded as conquered territory, no longer liberated territory. Victor was no longer to have anything to do with the Mid-West or make any announcement on its political disposition.

“He would support Victor in his attempt to liberate the West. He now had the backing of his Council to loan him Biafran forces on certain conditions:

a.) Biafran troops will remain in the West after the liberation for as long as he, Ojukwu, and Biafra deem fit;

b.) During that period, all political measures, statements and decrees must be subject to Ojukwu’s approval or on his authority;

c.) Victor’s appointment as military governor of the Yorubaland will emanate from Ojukwu and be subject to his pleasure;

d.) Should Lagos be also liberated by the forces under Victor’s Command, Ojukwu and Biafra will have the right to nominate a military administrator for Lagos. Lagos, for the purpose of this exercise, is therefore not considered Yorubaland until a merger of that territory is effected with Yorubaland. No such condition was necessary for all the other Yorubaland territory north of Western Region to Jebba on the Niger.

“How, after the volte-face in the Mid-West, anyone expects Victor to accept these conditions beats the imagination! Victor must have written his consent as required in the document. He thus won his freedom from arrest and detention to lead now the 54^th Brigade to Yorubaland?

“Victor thought he needed time to work out another strategy to resolve the problem in keeping in view his ideas on the concept of one Nigeria. Back at Benin, he met a demoralised and frightened Biafran force and a hostile civilian population who did not bargain for subjugation under Biafra. As Ogbemudia in his book, Years of Challenge, observed: ‘An underground resistance movement was formed to harass the now largely Ibo occupation force. There were also very many incidence of arrests and killing of the non-Ibo population.’ It gave Victor a preview of what would happen in Yorubaland, if he also overran it for the Ojukwu government of the Mid-West.

“It has been suggested in the writings of some Biafran officers that Victor was unable to return to the West. Even Gowon admitted to his wife that they knew he had nothing to do with the January 15, 1966 coup. Nobody was looking for him for a revenge action. In the West, he was well thought of. Victor was a nationalist to the core. He sympathised with the Biafrans for the genocide directed at them, but his concept of one Nigeria was steadfast.

“This gave credence to the real or imagined dialogue between Ojukwu and Victor that Kole Omotoso recorded in his book, Just before dawn, (pages 286/287). ‘Victor …”We must enlarge the base of the struggle beyond the suffering Ibos.” Ojukwu …”Victor, I don’t know if you know how much people have suffered …” Victor …”We must not forget the feelings of the minorities … They are of importance in the way this whole thing will turn out.” Ojukwu … “Don’t talk to me about minorities,” Ojukwu said, waving aside the issue. Victor Banjo could not believe that someone of Ojukwu’s intelligence could not recognise that the case of the Ibos must be a base to launch forward for the rest of the country.”

“The full import of this discussion must have dawned on Victor, if in fact, it did take place. On his release from detention to return to Benin to salvage the deteriorating situation, he must have reflected on the Biafran leader’s bidding in relation to the West. Victor was nobody’s puppet as observed by the British Times of London. He did what his gentleman officer’s mind dictated. He was a highly moral and caring person. Ademoyega, again, commented on his high moral standard, thus: ‘Finally, the charge the he, Banjo, took money from the British High Commission was utterly false and frivolous. Ojukwu himself knew that to be so. Banjo was w ell to do officer and was quite comfortable. He had no need to look for cash. Banjo entered the Mid-West with no more than five thousand pounds given him for the operations. He had not spent more than five hundred pounds, before he handed over the remainder to me for operations. While in Benin, he received several instructions from Ojukwu to break into the Central Bank, Benin and remove whatever money was there. Banjo completely refused to do it, saying it was not honourable. The truth was Ojukwu needed a scapegoat for his utter lack of preparation for the war and for his failure to find means of supporting his soldiers on the field.’

“Victor always liked tidy situations according to records left in his trail. He stopped to make sure there was a friendly government behind him in the Mid-West, instead of dashing off to Lagos and risk running into an ambush of federal troops both in front and behind him. He also wanted to make sure he could come into the West without spilling innocent blood. This time, he saw the writing on the wall. The bridges had been broken; the performance of Biafran troops had deteriorated. They were unable to perform against a superior federal force. Victor did not run away either. Instead, he withdrew the already demoralised Biafran troops to Agbor, where they would be safer in an Ibo area of the Mid-West, and then came back to Biafra to confront Ojukwu with the realities of the situation and plans for a new strategy for participation in the federation. He knew he was taking a risk, but he decided that was the honourable option for him.”

Ends. For now. But I am prepared for queries.

Wale Adedayo

A short history of Ijebu Ife

A short history of Ijebu Ife

The following is an account of the history of Ijebu Ife as recorded by historians and which is in accord with the traditions handed down by the ancestors of the King of the town, Ajalorun:

Olofin Ogbolu, eldest son of King Oduduwa succeeded his father. He had only reigned for some few years in Ile Ife when, as a result of an annual consultation of Ifa Oracle, the High Priest delivered a message that unless the King, Olofin Ogbolu, relocate from the town with all his sub-chiefs to another part of the Yoruba country to establish themselves anew, Ile Ife and its surrounding towns would be destroyed by flood.

As was customary with our ancestors, Olofin had no choice than to abide with what Ifa decreed. And in company with his chiefs and people, he arrived in many places where Ifa, upon consultations, did not allow him to settle. Some of these include Emuren in Remo Division, Isiwu in Ikorodu Division, Erunwon and Ilefon near Ijebu Ode, Odogbolu, Okemori and Idotun near Isonyin, Odongbodu, Egbe, Okeyejo, Okelugbogu, Imomo, etc, in Ilugun Alaro area of Ijebu Division.

The Elemuren, the Elerunwon, the Alse Omo of Isiwu were permitted by the Ajalorun Olofin Ogbolu to wear beaded crown. “In 1894” the Elemuren entered into treaty of friendship and protection with the British government. There was none of the articles of that treaty in which Elemuren was referred to as “chief” but as King of Emuren.

The Elemuren is a traditional son of Oba Ajalorun of Ijebu Ife to whom he owes the origin of his crown (see page 47 Obaship and Chieftancy by E. Alademomi Kenyo). The Elerunwon of Erunwon near Ijebu Ode has been wearing beaded crown in his settlement since about 1445 A.D. before the Ajalorun finally arrived in Idofe, Oke Ife, about 1450 A.D. i.e 20 years before Obanta arrived in Ijebu in 1470 A.D.

The Intelligence Report of May 1943 by T. B. Bowell-Jones, District Officer (Special Duty) para. 35B Ijebu Ode Villages, admit that the Elerunwon left Ile Ife with the Ajalorun of Ijebu Ife, first settling at Imewuro in the Ilugun Area, then at Idorunwon and Iwaye in the same area, thence to Idotun near Isonyin and finally to Erunwon, where the Ifa oracle was consulted with favourable results; the Ajalorun was the elder brother and that Obanta had not yet arrived in Ijebu Ode.

Excerpts from: History of Ijebu Ife.